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Expert Testimony in North Carolina Criminal Trials in a PostHowerton World
Dean P. LovenI
I.

Setting the Standard for Expert Testimony under
Howerton

For the past several years, controversy existed in North
Carolina as to the standard for determining the admission of expert
testimony. 2 The North Carolina Supreme Court recently put this
3
controversy to rest in Howerton v. Arai Helmet, Ltd. In
Howerton, the court flatly rejected the gatekeeping test adopted by
the United States Supreme Court in Daubertv. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.4 Instead, the court reiterated its previous
three part test: "(1) Is the expert's proffered method of proof
sufficiently reliable as an area for expert testimony? (2) Is the
of
witness testifying at trial qualified as an expert in that
5 area
relevant?",
testimony
expert's
the
Is
(3)
testimony?
With respect to the first factor, admissibility is favored
when precedent has accepted its admission, and disfavored when
such methods have previously been found to be inherently
unreliable. 6 "Where, however, the trial court is without
precedential guidance or faced with novel scientific theories,
unestablished techniques, or compelling new perspectives on
otherwise settled theories or techniques," the trial court must look
to other "'indices of reliability' to determine whether the expert's
proffered scientific or technical method of proof is sufficiently

1Mr. Loven is an Assistant Public Defender in Charlotte, N.C. He received his
J.D. from the University of North Carolina School of Law.
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 702 (2004).
3 597 S.E.2d 674, 687 (N.C. 2004).
4 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5 Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 686, (citing State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 639-41
(N.C. 1995)).
6 See id. at 459-60.
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reliable[.]' ' ' 7 Such indices include "the expert's use of established
techniques, the expert's professional background in the field, the
use of visual aids before the jury so that the jury is not asked to
'sacrifice its independence by accepting [the] scientific hypotheses
on faith,' and independent research conducted by the expert.",8
This list, however, is not exhaustive. Thus, while the trial court
must make a preliminary foundational inquiry into the basic
methodological adequacy of an area of expert testimony,
[t]his assessment does not, however, go so far as to
require the expert's testimony be proven
conclusively reliable or indisputably valid before it
can be admitted into evidence. In this regard, we
emphasize the fundamental distinction between the
admissibility of evidence and its weight, the latter
of which is a matter traditionally reserved for the
jury.9

"Therefore, once the trial court makes a preliminary determination
that the scientific or technical area underlying a qualified expert's
opinion is sufficiently reliable (and, of course, relevant), any
lingering questions or controversy concerning the quality of the
expert's conclusions go to the weight of the testimony rather than
its admissibility." 10 The court noted that "vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.""
Finally, the court noted that expert testimony, like any testimony,
must be excluded under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C- 1, Rule 403 "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
12
presentation of cumulative evidence."
at 687 (quoting State v. Pennington, 393 S.E.2d 487, 453 (N.C.1990)).
id.
9Id.(citing Queen City Coach Co. v. Lee, 11 S.E.2d 341, 343 (N.C. 1940)).
1 I1d. at 688 (citing State v. Barnes, 430 S.E.2d 223, 231 (N.C. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 496 (1992)).
" Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 688 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. at 596, 125 (1993)).
12 ld.at 689.
7Id.
8
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Subsequent Application of Howerton

Despite its recent pronouncement, Howerton has already
generated appellate decisions concerning the admission of expert
testimony. In State v. Taylor,1 3 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals applied Howerton to expert testimony concerning
estimation of defendant's blood alcohol level using retrograde
extrapolation analysis. The majority of the court found expert
testimony based on this method had previously been accepted, but
noted the defendant had specifically challenged the use of the
average elimination rate as opposed to the defendant's actual
elimination rate in the calculation. 14 The majority then considered
whether use of the average elimination rate was sufficiently
reliable. The court reasoned that because the defendant did not
challenge the testifying expert's qualifications or the general
relevance of the testimony, the defendant had conceded the result
was sufficiently reliable to be considered by the jury under the first
step in State v. Goode.15 In reaching this conclusion, the court
took pains to note the expert testified that the elimination rate used
in the calculations was an average elimination rate and not the
prior
defendant's actual elimination rate, and that individuals with
rate.' 6
elimination
higher
a
have
would
alcohol
experience with
Judge Tyson concurred in the result, but argued the prior
discussion of the use of the average elimination rate was mere
dicta because a proper objection was not made at trial, and that
17
admission of such evidence in Taylor was erroneous. Judge
Tyson reasoned that the North Carolina Supreme Court had
previously rejected the use of statistical averages to predict how a
specific action occurred or how an individual may have reacted or
responded in a specific case where there are a large number of
variables that could affect the measurement." Because the expert
13 600 S.E.2d 483 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
14Id. at 488 (citing State v. Catoe, 336 S.E.2d

691 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985), disc.
1986)).
review denied, 344 S.E.2d 1 (N.C.
15See id. (citing State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631 (N.C. 1995)).
16 See id. at 487-88.
17 Id. at 490 (citing State v. Taylor, 600 S.E.2d 483 (N.C. 2004)). 0
18Id. (citing Hughes v. Vestal, 142 S.E.2d 361, 365 (N.C. 1965)) (noting that in
this case the variables admitted to by the testifying expert included gender,
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improperly relied upon the average elimination rate to form his
opinion as to the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of the
accident, the evidence was "hearsay, purely circumstantial, and
irrelevant to [the] defendant's alcohol elimination rate and blood
alcohol concentration at the time of the accident."' 19 He went on to
state that admission of such hearsay testimony denied the
defendant the right to confront and cross-examine the source of the
hearsay declarations. 20 Despite his conclusion that the average
elimination rate was improperly admitted, Judge Tyson found the
error to be harmless in light of other evidence of defendant's guilt,
and therefore voted to affirm the defendant's conviction.2 '
In State v. Morgan,22 the North Carolina Supreme Court
addressed the limited issue of the qualifications of an expert in
blood stain pattern interpretation. The court concluded that the
testifying agent's failure to write or lecture on the topic or take any
college level courses on the topic did not disqualify him as an
expert, given his completion of two training sessions on bloodstain
pattern interpretation, analysis of blood stain patterns in dozens of
cases, previous acceptance as an expert in the area, and testimony
at trial, including the use of visual aids and distinguishing the
differences between blood spatter and transfer stains.23
The first post-Howerton case to address the admissibility of
a new scientific method involved the identification of glass
fragments. 24 First, the court noted that the trial court heard
extensive voir dire testimony as to the methods the proffered
witness used to support the finding that the physical properties of
the standard and unknown sample from the defendant's shoe were
similar, and supporting the conclusion that the witness "[could] not
rule out that the particle did not come from that source [the broken
window]. 25 Second, the trial court properly determined that the
height, weight, age, elapsed time since eating, recent consumption of alcohol,
tYe of alcohol consumed, and the person's prior experience with alcohol).
ate v. Taylor, 600 S.E.2d 483 at 491.
20
1d. at 492.
21 id.
22

604 S.E.2d 886 (N.C. 2004).

23

Id. at 904.

24

State v. McVay, 606 S.E.2d 145 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
at 148.

21Id.
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investigator qualified as an expert. 26 Finally, the court noted that
the relevance of the expert testimony was not questioned.27
In sum, post-Howertoncases, especially Taylor, have put
great weight on the jury sorting through the nuances of expert
testimony in novel areas even when there is no battle of the experts
to sharpen the issues.
III.

The Impact of Differences in Criminal and Civil
Procedure on the Application of Howerton

With the notable exception for the testimony of mental
health experts, the State or North Carolina is generally the
proponent of expert testimony in criminal proceedings. As a
result, the criminal defendant is generally in the same position as
the civil defendant in attempting to suppress the introduction of
expert testimony at trial or countering such testimony if it is
admitted. However, the tools available to the criminal defendant
are different than those available in civil cases, resulting in a
different means for attacking such testimony. In addition, the
incentive for attacking expert testimony is often different in
criminal and civil proceedings. In civil proceedings, expert
testimony may be essential to prove an element of the case.
Therefore any motion to suppress such testimony may be
dispositive. This was the case in Howerton, where the action was a
product liability claim alleging the plaintiff's injuries arose from
negligent design, manufacture and promotion of the defendant's
motorcycle helmet. 28 The expert testimony at issue attempted to
establish a causal link between the alleged negligent conduct and
plaintiffs injury.29 The trial court's decision to exclude the

of the action
testimony of the three experts resulted in dismissal
30
judgment.
summary
for
upon defendant's motion

Id. (citing Howerton, 597 S.E.2d 674, 688 (N.C. 2004); State v. Goodwin, 357
S.E.2d 639, 641 (N.C. 1987)); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 Rule 702 (2004).
27 See McVay, 606 S.E.2d at 149.
28 See Howerton, 597 S.E.2d at 678.
26

29

id.

'0 See id. at 683.
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In contrast, expert testimony in criminal cases often is but
one piece of evidence considered by the jury in evaluating the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. 3 1 Suppression of expert testimony
therefore rarely scuttles a criminal prosecution. As a result, the
criminal defendant generally has little incentive to seek to suppress
expert testimony by way of pretrial motions, relying instead on in
limine or voir dire motions to suppress such testimony. Even if a
motion to suppress is filed pretrial, the trial court may in its
discretion elect to hear the motion during trial. 32 The trial court
will undoubtedly do this in situations where the relevancy of the
evidence may be unclear until further evidence is presented at trial.
In addition, as a practical matter such motions may be delayed
until trial because the expert witness may have to be subpoenaed to
travel from another place to testify, and it is more convenient and
less costly to make one trip instead of two.
Even if the criminal defendant is in the position to
challenge expert testimony at trial, he or she may elect not to do so
for strategic reasons. For example, a defendant may choose not to
challenge expert testimony on DNA profiling in a rape case where
the defendant has raised the defense of consent. However, a more
fundamental reason may exist for not attacking the testimony.
Once trial has commenced, both the civil and the criminal
defendants face a dilemma concerning presentation of expert
testimony to counter the State's or plaintiff's expert. Any
See, e.g., State v. Taylor, 600 S.E.2d 483, 485-86 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (in
trial for habitual impaired driving, evidence in addition to that presented by the
expert concerning blood alcohol levels tended to show defendant was driving on
the wrong side of the road, hit another vehicle, was slumped over the wheel
while driving, had a strong odor or alcohol about him, needed assistance in
exiting his vehicle, was barely able to write a legible statement, failed the walk
and turn and sway tests as well as two other tests, and blew 0.05 on the
breathalyzer test); State v. McVay, 606 S.E.2d 145, 146 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(in trial for felonious breaking and entering, resisting or obstructing an officer,
and attaining the status of habitual felon, evidence in addition to that presented
by a glass shard analyst tended to place defendant at a nearby convenience store
shortly before the crime, to have placed him at the school at the time a loud
crash was heard by a witness who saw him running from the school, and to have
been near the broken window and running from the police, and was later found
in a nearby gully).
32 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-952(f) (2004).
31
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substantive evidence presented by the defendant, even during the
opposing party's case in chief, constitutes presentation of evidence.
When the defendant presents evidence, he or she loses certain
substantive rights, including the right to last argument,33 the right
insufficiency of the evidence at the
to seek dismissal based upon
4
4
close of all the evidence, and the right to challenge on appeal the
5
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction.3 Even a
challenge to the conclusions of an expert witness by calling to his
or her attention a learned treatise established as reliable authority is
admission of substantive evidence under an exception to the
hearsay rule.36
The defendant may, of course, present expert testimony
during voir dire in an effort to prevent the admission of such
testimony by the State without presenting evidence at trial, thereby
preserving these substantive rights. However, Howerton generally
favors admission of such testimony, leaving the matter for the jury
to consider after the issue is refined by cross-examination and
presentation of contrary evidence. This leaves the criminal
defendant with attempting to attack expert testimony solely on
cross-examination in order to protect various substantive rights.
As a result, the criminal trial record may lack the clarification of
issues often present in civil trial proceedings concerning expert
testimony. Given that the standard for admission of expert
testimony is abuse of discretion, 37 North Carolina appellate courts
will generally affirm admission of such testimony at trial. The trial
court also has broad discretion to determine the relevancy of such
testimony under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401,38 and whether
State v. Skipper, 446 S.E.2d 252, 268 (N.C. 1994), cert. denied,513 U.S.
1134 (1995); see also Rule 10 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior
Courts.
and
34 District
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-173 (2004); N.C.R. APP. P. 10(b)(3) (2004); State v.
Vanhoy, 471 S.E.2d 404, 407 (N.C. 1996), overruled on other grounds; State v
Gaines, 483 S.E.2d 396 (N.C. 1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 (1997).
35 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-173 (2004); N.C.R. APP. P. 10(b)(3) (2004); Vanhoy,
S.E.2d at 407.
471
36
N.C. GEN. STAT. §8C-1, Rule 803(18) (2004).
37 See State v. Davis, 542 S.E.2d 236, 241 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), disc. rev.
denied, 547 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. 2001).
38 See State v. Goode, 461 S.E.2d 631, 641 (N.C. 1995).
33
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its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403.39
Even when the criminal defendant intends to introduce
expert testimony at trial, the expert faces numerous procedural
hurdles that do not exist in civil proceedings. For example, in civil
proceedings, liberal discovery rules allow the civil defendant to
depose the plaintiff,40 require answers to interrogatories, 41 request
admissions,42 obtain relevant documents including medical
records,43 and may even require the plaintiff to submit to a
compulsory physical or mental examination." The civil defendant
can also discover the facts and opinions held by expert witnesses
who may testify for the plaintiff.45 The purpose of this rule is to
provide counsel for a party with sufficient information to crossexamine and rebut the testimony of an expert witness at trial.46
Civil discovery as to an expert opinion occurs in two stages. First,
the opposing party is asked to respond to interrogatories
identifying each expert witness he or she intends to call at trial, the
subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify, and the
substance of the facts and opinions to be offered and a summary of
the grounds for each opinion.47 The second stage is initiated by
motion pursuant to statute.48 Under this provision the court may
order further discovery through other means, usually by
49
deposition.
In contrast, the criminal defendant does not have the right
to compel any witness to submit to an interview before trial.5 °
However, the criminal defendant's access to a witness cannot be
39

State v. Mackey, 535 S.E.2d 555, 559 (N.C. 2000).

40

N.C. GEN.

STAT.

Id., Rule 33(a).
42
Id., Rule 36(a).

§ 1A-l, Rule 30(a) (2004).

41

Id., Rule 34(a).
44 Id., Rule 35(a).
45
Id., Rule 26(b)(4); Green v. Maness, 316 S.E.2d 911, 915-16
(N.C. Ct. App.
1984), cert. denied, 323 S.E.2d 922 (N.C. 1984).
46
N.C. GEN. STAT. § IA-l, Rule 26, Comment (2004).
41 Green, 316 S.E.2d at 915-16.
48
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1A-l, Rule 26(b)(4) (2004).
49
Id.
50 State v. Phillips, 399 S.E.2d 293, 301 (N.C. 1991), cert
denied, 501 U.S. 1208
(1991).
43
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impaired by the State.51 In addition, the right to take depositions in
criminal cases is limited by statute to preserving the testimony of a
person who is infirm, incapacitated, or a nonresident of North
Carolina. 52 Likewise, the criminal defendant cannot compel the
victim or a witness to submit to a psychological examination.53
However, if a witness or victim refuses to voluntarily submit to a
psychological examination, the trial court may grant relief
including appointment of an expert to assist in interpretation of
tests that have been performed, exclusion of such tests or evidence
relating to the person's condition from trial, and dismissal if failure
to submit to such tests impairs the defendant's right to present a
defense.54 Finally, the trial court does not have the power to 55
require a physical examination of an alleged victim or witness.
Absent the ability to collect evidence on his own behalf, the
criminal defendant is often forced to rely upon discovery statutes
to obtain the necessary information. However, even statutory
discovery rights are often more limited in a criminal as opposed to
a civil proceeding. For example, in the case of misdemeanor
charges where the original jurisdiction lies in district court there is
no statutory right of discovery before trial.56 In criminal
proceedings originating in superior court, which has original

51State

v. Pinch, 292 S.E.2d 203, 214-15 (N.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.

1189 (1983), overruledon other grounds; State v. Rouse, 451 S.E.2d 543 (N.C.
1994).
52 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-74 (2004); State v. Barfield, 322, 259 S.E.2d 510, 52526 (N.C. 1979), cert. denied 448 U.S. 907 (1980), overruledon othergrounds;
State v. Johnson, 344 S.E.2d 775 (N.C. 1986).
53 State v. Horn, 446 S.E.2d 52, 53 (N.C. 1994).
5
4 Id.

at 54.

55 State v. Hewett, 376 S.E.2d 467, 471-72 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989) (examination
of victim allowed only with consent of victim or victim's guardian); State v.
Tucker, 407 S.E.2d 805, 812 (N.C. 1991) (holding defendant not entitled to
nontestimonial identification order to obtain hair sample of another possible
suspect
where statute does not authorize defendant to obtain such an order).
56
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-902(c) (2004) (statutory motion for discovery must be
heard in superior court); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-271(a) (2004) (limiting the
authority of superior courts to have original jurisdiction over misdemeanors to
enumerated cases); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-272 (a) (2004) (district court has
jurisdiction to hear all other misdemeanors).
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jurisdiction for most felony charges,57 the State, upon motion of
the defendant, must give notice of any expert witness it reasonably
expects to call as a witness at trial. 8 The expert witness must
prepare and furnish to the defendant a report of the results of any
examination or tests, including the expert's opinion and underlying
59 The expert must also provide his or her
basis for that opinion.
60
vitae.
curriculum
In addition to statutory discovery rights, the criminal
defendant has the constitutional right to obtain certain evidence
from the State under the Fifth Amendment right of Due Process
and the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.6 '
This constitutional right includes access to evidence that would
tend to discredit the caliber of a police investigation, 62 which
arguably includes any laboratory reports tending to discredit the
findings in a given case. Such material must be made available,
even if the defendant does not make a request, 63 and must be
disclosed even if it is unknown to the defendant. 64 This material
arguably includes evidence that would discredit expert testimony.
The defendant therefore is entitled to review the tests performed or
procedures utilized by the experts to reach their conclusions.65 The
defendant is also entitled to laboratory protocol documents, reports
documenting "false positive" findings in the laboratory results, and
the credentials of the persons who performed the tests. 66 The
defendant is not, however, entitled to have the State provide results
of published empirical findings supporting the expert opinion,
citations to articles or chapters in learned treatises supporting the
57

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 1(a) (2004) (superior court has original jurisdiction
over all criminal actions not assigned to the district court); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-272(c) (2004) (district court has jurisdiction to accept plea of guilty to
class H or I felonies in certain cases).
58 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(2) (2004).
59 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-903(a)(3) (2004).
60 id.
61
62
63

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
Id.; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).

64 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
65 State v. Cunningham, 423 S.E.2d 802 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
66 State v. Dunn, 571 S.E.2d 650 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002), disc. review denied, 578
S.E.2d 314 (N.C. 2003).
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control information, or accreditation of the
opinion, quality
67
laboratory.
North Carolina's criminal discovery statute provides for
reciprocal discovery of defendant's expert witness testimony by
requiring notice of intent to call expert witnesses. 68 The State also
has the right to review in advance the results of physical or mental
examinations or tests the defense intends to introduce at trial.69
Reciprocal discovery, however, is limited to expert testimony the
defendant intends to introduce at trial. 70 The defendant must also
file notice of intent to offer certain defenses at trial, including alibi,
duress, entrapment, insanity, mental infirmity, diminished
capacity, self-defense, accident, automatism, involuntary
intoxication, and voluntary intoxication, many of which would
require the testimony of an expert witness to establish at trial. 7 '
Even when the defendant does obtain discovery, failure to
comply with procedural requirements may prevent the defendant
from being able to cross-examine certain expert witnesses
testifying for the State.72 Some question has arisen whether such
statutes will satisfy the Confrontation Clause requirements
addressed in Crawford v. Washington.73 In Crawford,the Court
held that the State may only introduce testimonial statements of
witnesses who are not subject to cross-examination when the
declarant is unavailable and the defendant has not had a prior
State v. Fair, 596 S.E.2d 871 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
GEN. STAT. § 905(c)(2) (2004).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-905(a) (2004).
70
Dunn, 571 S.E.2d at 650.
71 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-905(c) (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A- 959 (2004).
72 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(g) (2004) (allowing the state to submit a
67

68
N.C.
69

report of a chemical analysis of a controlled substance in lieu of calling the
analyst as a witness if certain conditions are met, namely filing a timely notice
of intent to do so and if the defendant fails to object); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9095(g 1) (2004) (similar provisions for establishing chain of custody); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-58.20 (2004) (same for forensic DNA analysis); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-139.1 (e 1) (2004) (providing for the use of an affidavit in District Court
without further authentication for testimony concerning the alcohol
concentration or concentration of other impairing substances in criminal
proceedings for various implied consent crimes, such as driving while
impaired).
73 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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opportunity for cross-examination. The Court, however, limited
this holding to testimony that is admitted for the truth of the matter
asserted.74 Under traditional rules of evidence, evidence
introduced for impeachment, corroboration, or as the basis for an
expert opinion is not introduced for the truth of the matter asserted.
The Confrontation Clause therefore arguably does not apply to any
statements the expert may rely upon in making his or her
conclusions, even when such statements are testimonial in nature.75
Even if such statements are testimonial and subject to the
requirements of Crawford,the question then becomes whether the
right of confrontation can be waived. It is well established that
procedural limits can be placed on the exercise of constitutional
rights and that failure to follow those requirements constitutes
waiver. 76 Because these statutes allow admission of expert
testimony by affidavit or other means when proper notice is given
of the intent to do so and when there is no objection, the statutes
are in effect a procedural limit on when a constitutional right may
be asserted.
If the criminal defendant has a need for the assistance of an
independent expert, one must be appointed when failure to do so
deprives him or her of a fair oportunity to present a defense,
thereby violating due process. North Carolina also provides a
statutory basis for appointment of experts to indigent criminal
defendants. 78 This right applies to any expert, 79 and at any stage of
74

1d. at 56.

See United States v. Stone, 222 F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (holding that
even if the statements relied upon by the expert were testimonial, the statements
may be used to form the expert opinion; further, if such statements were elicited
on cross examination, it would not be for hearsay purposes, but for evaluating
the opinion offered by the expert on direct examination).
76 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-975 (2004) (requiring pretrial motion to
suppress certain evidence obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional
rights); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-952(b)(2) (2004) (placing limitations on
motions to dismiss a grand jury indictment under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-955(1)
based upon a challenge to the composition of the grand jury array).
77 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
78
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450(b) (2004).
79 State v. Ballard, 428 S.E.2d 178, 179-80 (N.C. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
984 (1993).
75
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319

the criminal proceeding. 80 However, the indigent criminal
a constitutional right to the expert of his
defendant does not have
81
or her own choosing.
In North Carolina, a criminal defendant is entitled to an
appointed expert upon a showing that (1) the defendant is indigent,
and (2) failure to appoint an expert will deprive the defendant of a
fair trial or there is a reasonable likelihood an expert will
materially assist the defendant in the preparation of his or her
case.8 2 This does not require the defendant make a showing as to
83
what he or she intends to prove at trial. The constitutional and
statutory right to an appointed expert is relatively limited due to
the materiality requirement. When an expert is sought to explain
evidence or tests used, the defense counsel as a practical matter
may discuss the evidence such as the results of a test with the
84
expert witness for the State, such as a DNA analyst. Further,
even when funds for an expert can be obtained, it may be difficult
to actually find an expert willing to testify on behalf of the criminal
defendant, especially in such areas as child sexual abuse.
IV.

Impact of Howerton on Expert Testimony in Child
Sexual Abuse Cases

In many criminal cases, the expert is called upon to present
evidence tending to link the defendant to the crime scene using
evidence such as DNA profiling, fingerprint analysis, gunshot
residue analysis, and the like. In other cases, the expert might
State v. Moore, 364 S.E.2d 648 (1988) (right to expert to assist in pretrial
motion to suppress evidence).
81 Ake, 470 U.S. at 83; State v. Campbell, 460 S.E.2d 144, 150-51 (N.C. 1995)
(failure of expert to give desired opinion does not render the expert ineffective).
82 Moore, 364 S.E.2d at 652.
83 State v. Parks, 417 S.E.2d 467, 472 (N.C. 1992) (defendant is entitled to
expert when an expert when there is a reasonable likelihood that an expert will
materially assist in the preparation of the case; Moore, 364 S.E.2d at 654 (no
need to make a showing to discredit the expert's witness before defendant may
obtain an expert).
84 However, where the appointment of an expert is necessary to allow the
defendant to prepare his or her case in secret, such a request should be made ex
parte and would obviously preclude asking general questions of experts for the
State. See Ballard,428 S.E.2d at 179-80.
80
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testify as to the nature of an item alleged to be part of the criminal
act, such as handwriting analysis in the case of forgery or the
identity of a substance seized during a search as a controlled
substance. In some criminal cases, the expert is called upon to
testify that certain physical evidence or behavior is consistent with
the commission of a crime. For example, an expert may testify
that the results of a culposcopic examination are consistent with a
finding that a child has recently been sexually active, even though
such testimony cannot identify the person who sexually abused the
child. In other cases, an expert may testify that a child exhibits
symptoms or behaviors consistent with sexual abuse.
North Carolina courts have long recognized the prejudicial
nature of such testimony, especially when it tends to bolster the
credibility of the witness, and considerable case law has developed
in the area of expert testimony in child sexual abuse cases. For
example, a medical expert's testimony as to sexual abuse must be
based upon expertise, and not common sense. 85 Likewise, an
expert's opinion that a child has been abused cannot be based
solely on the child's statement she had been sexually abused
without actual physical evidence of abuse. 8 6 On the other hand, an
expert may testify as to the symptoms and characteristics of
sexually abused children when such testimony will assist the jury
in understanding the behavior patterns of sexually abused
children. 8 7 The expert also may testify that a particular child's
symptoms are consistent with those of sexual or physical abuse
victims, but only to aid the jury in assessing the complainant's
State v. Trent, 359 S.E.2d 463, 465-66 (N.C. 1987) (holding that the State laid
inadequate foundation for expert testimony concerning opinion as to whether
victim has been sexually abused when the examination was performed four
years after the alleged abuse; the examination allowed the expert to testify only
as to the victim being sexually active, not to sexual abuse; the expert was in no
better position than the jury to evaluate victim's history alleging sexual abuse by
the defendant); State v. Couser, 594 S.E.2d 420, 422-23 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(holding that the expert's admission on cross-examination that the abrasions she
observed on the introitus were not diagnostic nor specific to sexual abuse meant
the expert had insufficient physical evidence to support testimony about her
diagnosis and opinion that the victim was probably sexually abused).
86 State v. Grover, 543 S.E.2d 179, 183-84 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2001), afd,553,
S.E.2d 679 (N.C. 2001); State v. Stancil, 559 S.E.2d 788, 789 (N.C. 2002).
87 State v. Kennedy, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366 (N.C. 1987).
85
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credibility. 88 However, testimony about syndromes such as rape
trauma syndrome or post traumatic stress disorder should be
treated with caution through proper limiting instructions because
such a diagnosis has a therapeutic and not a fact-finding purpose
and the jury may place too much weight on such testimony without
making this distinction.89 In addition, rape is but one possible
cause of post-traumatic stress disorder.90 Such testimony is
allowed to corroborate other evidence that abuse occurred and to
explain certain characteristics, such as delay in reporting the
alleged abuse. 91 On the other hand, when the expert has directly
examined the victim and taken steps to confirm the victim's story,
the expert may testify as to the evidence of abuse, but cannot
testify as to92the conclusion the victim was sexually abused by the
defendant.
Will these limits on such expert testimony continue under
Howerton? In some cases, expert testimony will continue to be
excluded because the proponent has failed to lay a proper
foundation. However, Taylor indicates that in a post-Howerton
world it will be up to the jury to sort out confounding factors
which might provide alternate explanations for a given finding or
symptom. Therefore, evidence of rape trauma syndrome or posttraumatic stress will likely be admissible in more cases. Likewise,
testimony that certain physical signs are consistent with sexual
abuse or with other possible causes will probably be admissible
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 702. As a result, more expert
testimony will come before the jury in such cases.
Howerton will also put pressure on the courts to relax the
requirements as to the type of facts or data that an expert may
88 Id.

State v. Hall, 412 S.E.2d 883, 889 (N.C. 1992), citing with approvalPeople v.
Bledsoe, 681 P.2d 291, 300 (Cal. 1984) (noting that because their role is
therapeutic, rape counselors seldom challenge inconsistencies in their clients'
stories or independently investigate the facts).
89

90 Id.

91Id.; see also State v. Jackson, 358 S.E.2d 679 (N.C. 1987) (expert's testimony
determining likelihood defendant was the father based solely on expert's
assumptions about the case concerning defendant's access to the victim, as
held inadmissible).
opposed to scientific evidence for making the assumption
9'State v. Figured, 446 S.E.2d 838, 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994).
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reasonably rely upon when making his or her conclusion under
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 703. After all, if the jury must
evaluate the reliability of an opinion, why can the jury not also
evaluate reliability of the data upon which the conclusion is based?
For example, in State v. McCall,93 an expert who never examined
the alleged child victim and did not even hear the in-court
testimony of the child or any other witness was allowed to testify
as to whether the behavior of the child was consistent with the
behavior of a child that had been sexually abused in response to
hypothetical questions. 94 The admission of such testimony was
upheld under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 703. 9
McCall represents a typical criminal case where the
defendant presented no evidence. Challenges to expert testimony
therefore occurred only in a voir dire and on cross-examination.
On direct examination, an expert testified that she had reviewed a
copy of the child's statements to the police, a copy of the
Department of Social Service record, and the results of the child's
interview by the Pediatric Resource Center. 96 She was also given a
summary of the child's in-court testimony by the district
attorney.97 The expert then testified about the characteristics and
behavior of sexually abused children. 98 On cross-examination the
expert testified that the observed behavior could also be triggered
by other trauma. 99 The court upheld admission of the testimony,
noting that an expert is in a better position to determine if certain
behavior is consistent or inconsistent with individuals who have
been sexually abused. 100 Further, the expert's testimony "could
help the jury understand the behavior patterns of sexually abused
children, and assist in assessing the credibility of the victim." 10 1

9'
589 S.E.2d 896 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004).
94
Id. at 900.

95
96

Id.at 901.
Id.

97 id.
98

1d

99 Id.

"'Id., citing State v. Isenberg, 557 S.E.2d 568, 572 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001), disc.
review denied,561 S.E.2d 268 (N.C. 2002).
lot

Id. (quoting State v. Kennedy, 357 S.E.2d 359, 366 (N.C. 1987)).
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In cases such as State v. Figured,10 2 the testifying expert
had personally examined the victim. Case law also allows an
expert to base his or her conclusion on inherently reliable
information, and testify as to that information, even if such
10 3 In McCall, the expert
evidence is not otherwise admissible.
relied on testimony that was essentially testimonial in nature and
obtained with an eye towards litigation. Had the issue been raised,
the question in McCall was not whether an expert can make a
conclusion based upon reliable information, but whether the expert
used reliable information to reach her conclusion in this case.
Howerton does not address this issue, which arises under Rule 703
instead of 702. However, if a trial court is to liberally construe
Rule 702 for the admission of expert testimony, it stands to reason
that the basis for such testimony should also be liberally construed,
leaving to the jury the issue of whether the data or information is
sufficiently reliable.
Conclusion

V.

Howerton will liberalize the admission of evidence in
criminal trials in North Carolina. However, our rules of criminal
procedure are not equipped to deal with this expanded role of the
jury in evaluating expert testimony. As a result, the evaluation of
expert testimony will increasingly turn on its relevance under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 401, and its prejudicial effect under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403.
One reason problems arise with the admission of expert
testimony is that one rule is being used to fit all types of expert
testimony. Some opinions are more subject to evaluation using
scientific principles than are other opinions. For example, if there
is a question as to whether a given substance is cocaine, the
defendant may have the substance retested by an independent
laboratory. In contrast, two experts may disagree about the causal
link between the design of a helmet and a given injury, and the
agreement basically cannot be subject to independent laboratory
analysis.
102

446 S.E.2d 838.
v. Wade, 251 S.E.2d 407, 412 (N.C. 1979).

103 State
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Courts should consider developing two different standards
for admission of scientific testimony based upon the type of
opinion that is being proffered. Under this analysis, expert
testimony based upon specific tests would be evaluated under the
more relaxed standards of Howerton. In contrast, opinions that
require speculation and inference without laboratory analysis
would be subject to the gatekeeping analysis of Daubert. Most
expert testimony in criminal cases would fall under the more
liberal standards of Howerton. However, testimony such as that of
a child sexual abuse expert, which calls for a greater degree of
speculation, would be evaluated under the more stringent Daubert
standard. The development of two standards of review would
provide a threshold inquiry into the scientific basis for an opinion
in such cases without having to potentially remove the issue from
the jury on the ground of relevancy or prejudice. Development of
two standards of review would also address the concern that the
Howerton standard may be too liberal in some cases, and the
Daubertstandard too stringent in other cases. The best approach
may be to use both standards, depending upon the nature of the
proffered evidence.

